Now suppose people around that countryside area have constructed several barn facades which cannot be easily distinguished from real barns.
Since John cannot distinguish real barns from barn facades, he cannot claim to know that what he has seen are barns, although he has justified true belief. 4 . Suppose a ball looks red to you and on this basis you judge it to be red, and it is really red. But the ball is illuminated by red lights, and you do not know that it is illuminated by red lights. Since it is illuminated by red lights, it would look red to you even if it were not red. Hence you do not know that the ball is red, although your belief has been justified as the appropriate conditions of perception are present and your belief is true. Now it is claimed that Smith has justified true belief in R, as he has evidence for R, but does not know that R. 12 Counterexamples of this type have led to a number of defeasibility analyses of knowledge. A defeasibility analysis requires that there be no true defeaters. Following Klein and Pollock the defeasibility condition may be stated in the following way: 13 There is not a true proposition t such that if t were added to S's beliefs then S would no longer be justified in believing P.
By applying the defeasibility condition it is claimed that the above examples do not represent cases of knowledge. In our last example, if Smith had known the true proposition that Jones had entered a state of hypnosis, then he would not have believed that Jones owned a Ford. Hence Smith would no longer be justified in believing that someone who works in his office owns a Ford.
But Lehrer and Paxson have put forward the following counterexample to the above defeasibility analysis of knowledge:
6. 'Suppose I see a man walk into the library and remove a book from the library by concealing it beneath his coat. Since I am sure the man is Tom Grabit, whom I have often seen before when he attended my classes, I report that I know that Tom Grabit has removed the book. However, suppose further that Mrs Grabit, the mother of Tom, has averred that on the day in question Tom was not in the library, indeed, was thousands of miles away, and that Tom's identical twin brother, John Grabit, was in the library.
Imagine, moreover, that I am entirely ignorant of the fact that Mrs
Grabit has said these things. The statement that she has said these things would defeat any justification I have for believing that Tom Grabit removed the book, according to our present definition of defeasibility....
The preceding might seem acceptable until we finish the story by adding that Mrs Grabit is a compulsive and pathological liar, that John Grabit is a fiction of her demented mind, and that Tom Grabit took the book as I believed. Once this is added, it should be apparent that I did know that Tom Grabit removed the book.'
Since this example involves a true defeater defeater, the above formulation of defeasibility analysis cannot handle such cases. In order to deal with this type of example Moser 15 has suggested a more complex form of defeasibility analysis. According to him, S knows that P on the justifying evidence e then e must be truth-sustained. In other words, for every true proposition t, when t joined with e undermines S's justification for P on e, then there is a true proposition, t', such that when it is conjoined with e and t, it restores the justification of P for S.
Against this formulation it may be said that we can never be sure that we know the proposition in question, because it is not always possible to know a true proposition which will restore the previous belief. Moreover, this type of defeater defeater regress may occur again. It is also claimed that by adding a true proposition which will restore the previous belief we may be adding new reasons for believing the previous proposition. Hence we may not be restoring the old reason. 16 Some philosophers are also sceptical about the fourth condition of knowledge, which can handle both the Gettier and the post-Gettier type of counterexamples. Pollock 17 claims that no proposal of this sort has been worked out in the literature. Similarly, Moser claims that there is no consensus among philosophers with respect to the fourth condition of knowledge. To quote Moser:
'The history of the attempted solutions to the Gettier problem is complex and open-ended; it has not produced consensus on any solution.'
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It may also be claimed that the proposals put forward to handle the Gettier-type of counterexamples are ad hoc. I think this is due to the fact that the belief-condition, the truth-condition and the justification-condition have been taken separately or in isolation. For this reason, even if all the conditions are satisfied we fail to establish that it is a case of justified true belief, where justification is a qualifier of truth, and truth is a qualifier of belief. Before discussing the above six counterexamples from the Nyāya point of view let us mention the reliable process theory of Goldman, which claims to solve some of the problems of Gettier-type counterexamples.
D) Reliable Process approach of Goldman:
Goldman 19 considers the causal factor of knowledge, but not pseudocausal factors. Let us consider his example. Tom wakes up in a foul mood one morning and says, 'Today is going to be a miserable day'. Suppose his day was miserable, and hence his belief was true. This type of causal justification is not adequate for knowledge. But the same belief will have the status of knowledge if it is based on an authority. Suppose Tom gets a phone call from his colleague who reports on excellent authority that half of the staff will be laid off and Tom is one of them. Hence Tom believes that today is going to be a miserable day, and suppose his belief is true, as he will be laid off. In this case Tom's belief will assume the status of knowledge as it is based on an authority. But a belief based on feelings or moods can easily go wrong. This is due to the fact that these processes are not reliable. Goldman claims that if a true belief is based on a reliable causal process, then it will have the status of knowledge. For this reason Goldman's theory is called the 'causal reliability approach', which is different from the 'reliable-indicator approach' of Armstrong. 20 Ramsey, for the first time, introduced the reliable process approach. He says, 'I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was (i) true, (ii) certain, and (iii) obtained by a reliable process'.
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Now we have several types of reliable-process approaches. The following pairs would give rise to several types of reliable-process theories: (a) global reliability and local reliability, (b) actual reliability and counterfactual reliability, (c) pure subjunctive reliability and relevant alternatives reliability. The last pair is the division of counterfactual reliability. The following diagram may represent different types of reliability theories:
Reliability approach
Indicator Process
Global-local Actual-counterfactual pure subjunctive relevant alternatives
If we combine the members of one pair with the members of another, then several other types of reliability approach can be generated.
The distinction between global and local reliability is drawn in terms of the ranges of uses of the process. Global reliability is applicable to all uses of the process, but local reliability deals with the reliability of process in a particular case. The actual-counterfactual distinction deals with the reliability of a process in actual or counterfactual situations. The counterfactual approach is divided into pure subjunctive and relevant alternatives. The pure subjunctive approach considers the situations in which the proposition in question were false.
The relevant alternatives approach of Goldman considers situations which are relevant alternatives to the truth of the proposition in question.
According to this approach, a true belief, say P, fails to acquire the status of knowledge if there are relevant alternative situations in which the proposition P would be false, but the process would cause the agent to believe in P. Hence the process cannot discriminate the truth of P from other alternatives. For example, Smith sees Judy crossing the street and correctly believes that Judy is crossing the street. If it were Trudy, Judy's twin sister, Smith could mistake her for Judy. If Smith could make this type of mistake, he does not know that Judy is crossing the street. The relevant alternatives approach considers only those alternatives which are relevant in that situation. Hence it considers the situation in which Judy's twin sister is crossing the street. But the pure subjunctive account considers the situations in which Judy is not crossing the street or Judy is not there. If, in such counterfactual situations, Smith would not believe that Judy is crossing the street, then Smith knows that Judy is crossing the street. Since this theory allows several types of possibilities, Goldman thinks it is too permissive.
For this reason he does not subscribe to the pure subjunctive approach.
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As regards the local and the global reliability approach, Goldman thinks that they are not mutually exclusive, and he subscribes to a theory which requires both. If a theory requires both, then a true belief assumes the status of knowledge, if it results from a generally reliable process and not just reliable in a particular case. Moreover, Goldman follows the relevant alternatives approach. Hence knowledge of a proposition P involves discriminating the truth of P from relevant alternatives that are counterfactuals. If the word 'reliable' is interpreted in this way, then
Goldman's definition of 'knowledge' may be expressed as follows:
S knows that P df. S's belief in P results from a reliable beliefforming process.
As regards the nature of reliable belief-forming processes, Goldman Jones does not own a Ford and Brown is not in Barcelona.
In other words, Smith will hold the same belief even if Jones does not own a Ford and Brown is not in Barcelona. Hence Smith fails to discriminate this counterfactual situation from the actual state of affairs.
Our example (6) is similar. In this case I fail to discriminate Tom Grabit from John Grabit. Hence I cannot discriminate Tom Grabit's stealing the book from the library from John Grabit's stealing the book from the library.
Here John Grabit's stealing the book is considered as a relevant alternative.
Goldman also claims that when I come to know that John was a fiction of Mrs Grabit's demented mind, this alternative ceases to be a relevant alternative, and I can be credited with knowledge. With respect to the first counterexample of Gettier, the Nyāya philosophers such as Udayana would claim that the conclusion of this inference is false. Therefore, it cannot be a case of knowledge. The belief or the cognition of Smith expressed by the sentence 'The person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' can be expressed in the following way:
'The person who will get the job being identical with Jones has ten coins in his pocket.'
This is due to the fact that the conclusion is derived from the belief that
Jones is the person who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Since Smith got the job and has ten coins in his pockets, the belief of Smith is false. Since this sentence can be used to express different beliefs,
we are not simply concerned with the truth of the sentence, but with the belief expressed by this sentence. In this case the belief it expresses is false.
With respect to the second counterexample of Gettier, it is a case of This sentence cannot be claimed to be true by virtue of having a man in this room, an iron mask in this room and a red object in this room. Hence from the Nyāya point of view justification is a qualifier of true belief. Here justification means some sort of guarantee for its truth.
As regards the post-Gettier counter example (3), the Nyāya claims that a physical object is not inferred from its look. Our sense-organs are related to the physical object, and the latter is one of the causal conditions of perceptual cognition or belief. Since there are both real barns and barn facades, our sense-organs are related to both. If we know the mode (or the limitor) under which a barn facade is presented, then we can discriminate a real barn from a barn facade. A limitor, according to the Nyāya, is a mode of presentation of the object(s) and it uniquely determines the referent(s) of a term. In this example, John has cognized both a real barn and a barn facade.
Since he cannot discriminate a real barn from a barn facade, he has not cognized the mode under which a real barn is presented and the mode under which a barn facade is presented. Since John believes that these are barns while some of them are barn facades, his belief cannot be said to be true.
Hence it cannot be treated as a counterexample.
As regards (4), the Nyāya would claim that our sense-organs are related to both the ball and its red colour as it is red. Moreover, both the objects and the relations between objects and sense-organs are causal conditions for perceptual cognitions. If the red colour of the ball is presented under the mode of redness which is its limitor, then it would be a case of knowledge.
If a person knows redness that determines red colours only, and not the reflection due to red light, then he can discriminate a real red colour from the reflection of red colour, which is due to illumination of red lights.
Hence the Nyāya claims that if the red colour is presented under the mode of redness, then the perceiver would be able to discriminate and his/her cognition would have the status of knowledge. On the contrary, if he/she cannot discriminate, then the truth of the belief that the ball is red lacks justification.
As regards example (5), the Nyāya claims that Jones does not satisfy the criteria for being an āpta (authority or trustworthy person). A person is an āpta iff (a) he/she has a true cognition of what he/she says, (b) he/she selects the appropriate expressions to convey his/her true cognition, (c) he/she is not lying, and (d) his/her sense-organs that are causal conditions for utterance or inscription do not suffer from any defect or weakness.
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In this case, Jones does not know that he has won a car in a lottery. Hence he ceases to be an āpta or a trustworthy person. For this reason his utterance cannot be considered as a source of valid cognition, although the sentence he has uttered is true and the sentence would generate a true cognition in the hearer. Since there is no guarantee or justification for the true cognition generated by his utterance, it does not have the status of knowledge.
As regards example (6), the Nyāya claims that if Tom Grabit is presented to me under the mode of a unique property, then I would be able to identify him in every situation. Hence there would be no relevant alternatives which would defeat my knowledge-claim. If Tom Grabit is cognized under the mode of a unique property which will distinguish him from all other individuals, then there would be guarantee for the truth of the belief that Tom Grabit has removed the book from the library. If there is a guarantee for the truth of this belief, then there cannot be a true defeater. Hence it rules out the possibility of true defeater defeater regress.
As regards example (7) of Goldman, it is neither a case of perception nor is it a case of testimony. Obviously, it is not a case of an inferential cognition as it is not derived from a mark (hetu). Hence it does not come under any sources of valid cognition. It is to be remembered that, according to the Nyāya, the object of cognition, the sense-contact with the object and the contact with the qualified object of the form a being F are causal conditions of a true perceptual cognition. Since these conditions have not been satisfied, this example cannot be treated as a case of true perception.
Again, since the demon wants to deceive us, he fails to satisfy the conditions for being an āpta or trustworthy person. Hence it cannot be a case of testimony.
With respect to example (8) Moreover, if there is justification for the truth of a belief, then the believer can identify or discriminate the fact which corresponds to this belief. The process which guarantees the truth of a belief is repeatable and objective.
It can be used to generate a similar belief in others. Hence if I know that p, then you can also know that p. Since the process guarantees the truth of a belief, if I know that p, then I cannot be wrong. anuyogī -pratiyogī (first term -second term)
ādhāra -ādheya (substratum -superstratum)
viśeṣya -viśeṣaṇa (qualificand -qualifier)
viśeṣya -prakāra (qualificand -relational qualifier).
But in the case of a verbal cognition the Nyāya uses the following pairs:
viśeṣya -prakāra (qualificand -relational qualifier)
uddeśya -vidheya (subject -predicate).
The explanation of an inference for others involves the pair pakṣa-sādhya (the locus of inference -probandum) in addition to all the five pairs mentioned above.
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G)
The Nyāya on Knowledge:
The Nyāya philosophers have discussed the conditions or causal conditions of cognition, conditions of a true cognition, conditions of a false cognition, and conditions which justify the truth of a cognition. The causal conditions involved in the process are not exclusively internal. Hence some conditions are external.
The Nyāya claims that there are both a set of positive and a set of negative causal conditions of perception. The perceiver (the self), the internal sense-organ (manas), the external sense-organs (such as eyes), the objects of perception, the sense-object contact, etc., are positive causal conditions. In addition to these causal conditions, there are certain negative causal conditions. In this context it is to be noted that the Sāṃkhya philosophers have mentioned the following negative causal conditions of perception, some of which have been accepted by the Nyāya:
Not being too far (atidūratābhāva);
Not being too close (atisāmīpyābhāva);
Absence of loss of sense-organs, such as deafness, blindness, etc. (indriyanāśābhāva);
Not being inattentive (mano'navasthānābhāva);
Not being too subtle (sūkṣmābhāva);
Not having intervening objects such as wall, screen, etc.
(vyavadhānābhāva); a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Not being overshadowed (or covered) by a more powerful object (abhibhavābhāva), e.g., during the day, stars are not visible as they are overshadowed by the rays of the sun;
Not being mixed up with similar objects (samānābhihārābhāva), e.g., rain water cannot be perceived in a lake or a river separately as it is mixed up with similar objects.
But the Nyāya philosophers have not treated all of them as negative causal conditions.
They would consider only (a), (b), (g) and (h) as negative causal conditions. The remaining four will be considered positive. Therefore the third one will be normal sense-organs instead of absence of loss of senseorgans. The fourth one will be attentive instead of not being inattentive, and the fifth one having some magnitude (mahatva) instead of not being too subtle. The sixth one is to be rejected as negative on the ground that the sense-object contact is a positive causal condition. Hence the Nyāya philosophers would consider only (a), (b), (g) and (h) in the above list as negative.
In the case of an ordinary perceptual cognition sense-organs are special instrumental causes (karaṇas), and the sense-object contact is the operation (vyāpāra). The technical terms 'karaṇa' and 'vyāpāra' may be defined in the following way:
(i) x is a vyāpāra (operation) of the effect E iff (Ey) (y is a cause of E and x is a cause of E, but x is due to y).
(ii) x is a karaṇa (special instrumental cause) of the effect E iff x is a causal condition, x is related to the locus of E through an operation, and it is considered as a cause due to this relation only.
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Let us consider the following example of the Nyāya philosophers:
The floor has a pot. In this case our visual sense-organ is the special instrumental cause, and the contact between the visual sense-organ and the floor is the operation. Since our sense-organ is related to the floor, it is also related to the pot which is on the floor. Since the cognition that the floor has a pot is due to a sense-organ, it is considered as perceptual. In this case the objects of cognition such as the floor, the pot and the relation of conjunction are related to the cognition. Hence the cognition is also related to all these items. The cognition will be related to these items even if it is false. Hence in terms of the relation between these items and the cognition alone we cannot draw the distinction between a true and a false cognition. When g.
h.
a perceptual cognition is true, our sense-organ is related to the qualified object. In the above example, our visual sense-organ is not only related to the floor, but also to the floor that is qualified by a pot on it.
Hence the cognition generated by this process will be related to the perception could be false due to distance (dūratva), which is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true cognition. Similarly, it could be false due to weakness of the visual sense-organ or due to the absence of the visual sense-organ.
In our above example, if the cognition is true, then it is related to the floor, the pot, the relation of conjunction, and the qualified object, i.e., the floor qualified by a pot on it.
The causal conditions of this perceptual cognition would include the relation of the visual sense-organ to these items. But, in addition to these relations of the cognition to its objects, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted the relation of the cognition to universal floorness and the relation of the cognition to universal potness. Now the question is, what is the need for these additional relations?
In this context it is to be noted that some contemporary epistemologists claim that identification and discrimination are necessary for knowledge.
On Goldman's theory, if S knows that p, then S can discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives. In his system these alternatives are counterfactual. But his theory cannot explain why a person, say Smith, is able to discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives, but another person, say Jones, is not able to discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives. The Nyāya can explain this phenomenon in terms of the relation of Smith's cognition to the universal floorness and the universal potness which are limitors of a floor and a pot respectively.
Since Smith's sense-organ is related not only to the floor and the pot, but also to their limitors, his cognition is related to these limitors as well. Since the cognition of limitors can explain our ability to discriminate, there is a need for these limitors in epistemic contexts.
Similarly, in the case of an inference, 37 the Nyāya philosophers have discussed the causal conditions of an inferential cognition (anumiti), the causal conditions of its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which justify the truth of an inferential cognition or the ability to discriminate.
An inference, according to the Nyāya, has three terms, namely, sādhya (probandum), pakṣa (locus of inference), and hetu (probans, or reason).
The term sādhya refers to what is to be inferred. The term pakṣa refers to the locus of inference where there is some doubt about the presence of sādhya. The term hetu refers to the reason by means of which the sādhya is inferred in the pakṣa. In this context it is to be noted that an inference for others, according to the Nyāya, involves five members, which are related to each other by the relation of relevance. Relevance is a relation between the contents of expressions or sentences via some questions.
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Let us consider the following inference for others:
The mountain has a fire.
Reason (hetu): Because of smoke.
Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen, etc.
Application (upanaya):
The mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire.
Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore, the mountain has a fire.
This inference has the following form:
Reason (hetu): Because of F.
Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is F, there is G, as in b, etc.
Application (upanaya): a has F, which is pervaded by G.
Conclusion (nigamana):
Hence a is G, or G is present in a, where a is the locus of the inference (pakṣa), F is the probans, G is the probandum, b is the locus where G is known to be present (sapakṣa ). The Nyāya philosophers have also discussed our ability to discriminate in the case of inferential cognition. Consider the following inference:
Wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire.
The mountain has blue smoke.
Therefore, the mountain has fire.
In this inference the conclusion follows from the premises, and both the conclusion and the premises are true. Now the Nyāya raises the question whether the cognition expressed by the sentence 'wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire' is such that the property of being the pervaded residing in blue smoke which is signified by the expression 'wherever' is limited by blue smokeness or by smokeness only. In other words, the question is a.
whether the property of being the pervaded is presented under the mode of blue smokeness (i.e. blueness and smokeness) or under the mode of smokeness. If it is presented under the mode of blue smokeness, then the person, who has inferred the mountain has fire from the above two premises,
would not be able to infer the same conclusion from the cognition of 'the mountain has black smoke.' On the contrary, if he/she would have inferred 'the mountain has fire' from 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and the mountain has smoke', then he/she would be able to infer 'the mountain has fire' from the observation of black smoke as well. This is due to the fact that the mode of presentation of the property of being the pervaded signified by the expression 'wherever' is smokeness, not blue smokeness.
Since the property of being the pervaded residing in any smoke, blue or black, is limited by smokeness, the cognitions expressed by sentences such as 'wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire,' and 'wherever there is black smoke, there is fire' would be true. In other words, if the property of being the pervaded is cognized under the mode of smokeness, then it reveals an ontological property of smoke, blue or black. Hence the cognition of smoke as qualified by smokeness, not as qualified by blue smokeness, gives us a guarantee for making similar inferences. Therefore, a person is able to infer fire from any smoke, blue or black, if he/she has cognised the property of being the pervaded under the mode of smokeness. Hence the Nyāya not only emphasizes our ability to discriminate in the case of inference, but also explains this ability in terms of the cognition of certain properties. In this case, it is the cognition of the limitor of the property of being the pervaded which resides in the probans.
With respect to a verbal cognition (testimony) also, the Nyāya philosophers have discussed its causal conditions, the causal conditions of its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which justify its truth .
The special instrumental cause (karaṇa) of the cognition of the meaning of a sentence is the cognition of the words contained in it, and the operation of this cognition is the memory-cognition of the referents of the words.
According to the Nyāya, the cognition of the meaning of a sentence, as distinct from the cognition of the meanings of its parts, lies in cognizing the relation between the referents of its parts which are sets of expressions.
Hence the cognition of the meaning of the sentence 'a flower is red' lies in cognizing the relation of a red colour to a flower. If the sentence is true, then it would generate a true cognition, and the cogniser would apprehend the relation which holds between a red colour and a flower. If the sentence is false, then it would generate a false cognition, and the cogniser would apprehend a relation which does not hold between a red colour and a flower, but which holds between some other objects such as between a red colour and a table. Now the question is whether a true cognition generated by a true sentence has the status of knowledge. On this point the Nyāya claims that it would be a case of knowledge if the true sentence is uttered or inscribed by an āpta (a trustworthy person). This is due to the fact that a true cognition generated by the utterance of an āpta has justification. Therefore, it has the status of knowledge.
From our above discussion it follows that knowledge is justified true cognition or belief, provided justification is a qualifier of true cognition or belief. A true cognition is justified by certain perceptual causal conditions, or by certain inferential causal conditions, or by certain verbal causal conditions. Hence the Nyāya technique for justifying a true cognition may be used for interpreting or explicating the meaning of the word 'knowledge.'
From the above discussion it also follows that the Nyāya philosophers have treated justification as a qualifier of true belief, and have emphasized the sources of valid cognition, which will explain why certain true beliefs have justification. Moreover, the Nyāya explains the ability to discriminate an object or a set of objects in terms of the cognition of limitor(s). This explanation allows us to solve some problems of contemporary Western philosophy.
Belief and Doubt
In this section I shall discuss the Nyāya conception of belief as well as doubt. Since there is no proposition as distinct from a sentence, beliefs are considered true or false. Moreover since the Nyāya philosophers could also accept the definition of knowledge as justified true belief, I'd like to focus on the Nyāya concept of belief. Moreover, the Nyāya discussion of belief suggests solutions to some problems of belief in the Western philosophy.
Since belief, according to the Nyāya, is a doubt-free cognition, I shall explain the Nyāya concept of doubt as well.
The importance of belief has been emphasized very widely in Western philosophy in which it is considered as the central problem. To quote and metaphysics revolve about belief, and on the view we take of belief our philosophical outlook largely depends. 39 Ramsey also claimed that a belief is "a map of neighbouring space by which we steer." 40 So he attributes two characteristics to a belief: it is a map, and it is something by which we steer. I would like to claim that the set of beliefs of a person represents his/her form of life. It determines the entire mental life of a person, including emotions, feelings and attitudes.
There are four views in Western tradition concerning the category to which belief belongs: (i) Belief is a faculty of mind; (ii) it is a disposition of the believer; (iii) it is a conscious occurrence in the mind of the believer;
and (iv) it is a mental state of the believer's mind. Since I would like to focus on the nature of belief-sentences, in this paper I do not intend to discuss the category to which belief belongs. However, I consider belief as a mental state of the believer, dispositional or conscious.
In this section I shall discuss A) contemporary theories of belief; B) the Nyāya concept of doubt; and C) the Nyāya explanation of belief-sentences.
A) Contemporary Theories:
There are six approaches to the problems of belief-sentences in contemporary Western philosophy, which I will outline below. From this remark of Russell's, it follows that the meaning of a beliefsentence is to be identified with the meaning of a sentence about behaviour.
The Rylean approach is not identical with the above type of behaviourism, although there is some close affinity between these two views. According to Ryle, a belief-sentence, taken literally, has made a category mistake. But if it is taken as a dispositional statement, not descriptive of something, then it is ultimately reducible to a hypothetical statement about our behaviour. Since this view is also committed to many dubious assumptions about the nature of mind (or self) or human being, it will not be acceptable to those philosophers who are not already committed to those assumptions. c) Another approach to the problems of belief-sentences is to be found in Frege, and this approach has been defended by Church. Frege says:
In indirect (oblique) discourse we speak of the sense, e.g., of the words of someone else. From this it becomes clear that also in indirect discourse words do not have their customary nominata;
they here name what customarily would be their sense. In order to formulate this succinctly we shall say: words in indirect discourse are used indirectly, or have indirect nominata. Thus we distinguish the customary from the indirect nominatum of a word; and its customary sense from its indirect sense. 45 From this remark of Frege, along with his other remarks about belief, it follows that in the sentence But if belief is a relation between a person and a sentence, then (2) is to be interpreted as (4) John has the relation B to the sentence "the earth is round."
On either of these interpretations we cannot derive Knowledge, Belief and Doubt (5) John believes that die Erde ist rund, or any other sentence which is synonymous with (2).
If we apply this view to a sentence such as (6) John believes in
Shakespeare, then we have to paraphrase it in such a way that a sentence follows the verb "believes". But if we do not paraphrase it, then either we fail to give an account of such sentences, or we have to claim that belief is also a relation between a person and a word or the content of belief could also be a word, in addition to a sentence.
Since this view is very restrictive in the sense that it rules out the possibility of belief in animals, newborn babies and in persons who do not speak or understand any sentence, it may be rejected on this ground.
e) According to another view what occurs in a belief context is neither an expression nor its sense, but a vivid conception of an object. Kaplan calls it "vivid name". He says:
Our most vivid names can be roughly characterized as those elaborate descriptions containing all we believe about a single person. Such names will almost certainly contain inaccuracies which will prevent them from actually denoting anyone.
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From this remark of Kaplan it follows that a vivid name need not always be referential. A referential vivid name for a person, say Ralph, symbolized as "R(α , x, Ralph)" fulfils the following conditions according to Kaplan:
(ii) α is a name of x for Ralph, and (iii) α is (sufficiently) vivid.
By introducing a distinction between a merely vivid name and a referentially vivid name, Kaplan explains Quine's distinction between sentences such as f) There is still another approach to the problems of belief-sentences, which has been proposed by Russell, but not followed or refined or extended by other philosophers. Since the view of Russell has some affinity with that of the Nyāya, it will pave our discussion for the latter and hence it is worthy of consideration.
Russell, in "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," claimed that in a belief-sentence there are at least two verbs. Let us consider his example.
(10) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio.
Here the verbs "believes" and "loves" have occurred as genuine verbs, and the verb in the subordinate clause seems to relate Desdemona to Cassio; but in fact it does not do so. He says, This is what constitutes the puzzle about the nature of belief. You will notice that wherever one gets to really close quarters with the theory of error one has the puzzle of how to deal with error without assuming the existence of the non-existent.
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Now the question is how to explain the nature of (10) without postulating non-existent love as an entity, which will relate Desdemona to Cassio.
Moreover, Russell claimed that "loves" should be treated as a verb. This requirement leads to the rejection of his earlier view proposed in The Problems of Philosophy, 53 where (10) has been analysed as a four-place relation between Othello, Desdemona, loves, and Cassio. Hence (10) is to be analysed as (11) B (Othello, Desdemona, loves, Cassio).
Since the verb "loves" in (11) is on a par with the terms "Desdemona"
and "Cassio," this analysis does not fulfil one of the above requirements of ...the PP (Problems of Philosophy) theory of belief is defective in that it makes all belief relational and all occurrences of names in the believed-sentence transparent. A further difficulty is that it is hard to see how the theory is to be extended to cases in which the believed-sentence is non-atomic. 
B) The Nyāya Concept of Doubt:
Since the Nyāya claims that belief is a doubt-free cognition, I would like to discuss the Nyāya conception of dubious cognition. Moreover, the Nyāya analysis or conception of doubt may also solve some problems of Western philosophy or add a new dimension to Western philosophy, as the Nyāya claims that a dubious cognition rests on certainty.
Doubt, according to the Nyāya, is a type of invalid (false) cognition.
A dubious cognition can be expressed by the form 'Is x F or G?', where x is the property-possessor, F and G are mutually incompatible properties.
Since F and G are mutually incompatible, one of them may be the absence of the other. Hence it may be stated as 'Is x F or not F'. As regards the number of alternatives in a dubious cognition, such as "Is it a stump or a human being?", there is some difference of opinion among the Nyāya philosophers. But all of them have accepted the thesis that there are at least two mutually incompatible alternatives in a dubious cognition. It is to be noted that a dubious cognition cannot be identified with a question. A question presupposes the cognition of one of the alternatives. For example, the question "Is it a stump?" presupposes the cognition of stump only. But a dubious cognition presupposes the cognition of both the alternatives.
Moreover, in a question there is desire to know; but not a state of doubt, although there may be desire to know afterwards.
From the Nyāya conception of doubt it also follows that there is certainty about the property-possessor in a dubious mental state. Hence the dubious cognition of the form "Is x F or G" presupposes certainty with respect to
x. Therefore, we do not doubt the existence of x. The property-possessor may be an object of doubt in another mental state, where it is one of the alternatives. Hence a doubt presupposes certainty or rests on something which is free from doubt.
When I doubt the colour of the In this case, I presuppose the existence of the room. Hence there cannot be universal doubt, even if there is doubt about any specific thing or set of specific things. Moreover, there is no dubious mental state without presupposing something certain. Hence the Nyāya concept of doubt rules out universal scepticism. We may doubt almost anything, but not everything, and every dubious state has some element of certainty.
The Nyāya has classified doubts into four types depending upon the causal conditions of their origins. One of them is due to the observation of some common property or properties of the referents of 'F' and 'G', and the non-observation of any specific or unique property of the referents of 'F'
and 'G'. Consider again, for example, "Is it a stump or a human being?" The observation of common properties, such as identical or similar heights and widths, will give rise to the memory-cognitions of the alternatives that are causal conditions of a dubious cognition.
The second type of dubious cognition is due to the observation of an Similarly, the author of Waverley has the role of qualifier, and the relation of identity has the role of qualification relation in the content of this belief.
There are also other elements in its content. Since both "Shakespeare" and "the author of Waverley" have occurred in (i), both Shakespeare and the author of Waverley, according to the Nyāya, must be presented under some mode of presentation. In other words, the property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare is limited by the property of being Shakespeare, and the property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley is limited by the property of being the author of Waverley. Since identity has not been mentioned, it is not presented under some mode of presentation. So we have, broadly speaking, two terms called "qualificand" and "qualifier,"
the relation of identity, two property-limitors or modes of presentation and three relational properties of being the content. Now the question is how to explain the relation among these elements. The Nyāya claims that they are related in the following way:
The property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare is limited by the property of being Shakespeare.
The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley is limited by the property of being the author of
Waverley.
The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley is also limited by the relation of identity.
The property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley.
The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of
Waverley is determined by the property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare.
The property of being the qualification relation residing in identity is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley.
The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of
Waverley is determined by the property of being the qualification relation residing in identity.
In this context it is to be noted that the above three types of relations which relate a belief to its content, viz., the property of being the qualificand, the property of being the qualifier and the property of being the qualification relation, are present in any belief, true or false. But in a true belief there is another type of relation which relates the belief to the unified content or the fact by virtue of which a sentence is considered as true. Hence a knowledge which implies a true belief involves a relation of the belief to the fact that makes the belief true. For this reason, the Gettier-type objection does not apply to the Nyāya conception of knowledge.
Now let us discuss the nature of the belief-state. As a belief is related to its contents, so are the contents related to the belief. If the above three relations, viz., the property of being the qualificand, the property of being the qualifier and the property of being the qualification relation are called R, S and T respectively, then the relation of Shakespeare to this belief is the converse of R, the relation of the author of Waverley to this belief is the converse of S, and the relation of identity to this belief is the converse of T.
These are all properties of John's belief, and they are related to each other in the following way:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
(a) The converse of R is determined by the converse of S. It is to be noted that, according to the Nyāya, a relation performs two functions. It can be defined in the following way:
R is a relation Df. ( x) ( y) (It is due to R that x appears as the qualificand and y as the qualifier in the cognition xRy), and ( x) ( y) (It is due to R that there is a qualified object or fact xRy).
It is to be noted that the x and the y of the cognition need not be the same as the x and the y of the fact. If the cognition is true, then the x and the y of the cognition correspond to the x and the y of the fact. In our above example, the relation of identity is real elsewhere or elsewhen, to which the beliefstate is related. The cognizer is related to the relation of identity which holds between Helen Clark and the present Prime Minister of New Zealand.
Hence one of the functions of a relation has been satisfied. Again, it is due to this relation of identity that Shakespeare appears as the qualificand and (ii) John believes that the author of Waverley is Shakespeare.
In (ii) the author Waverley has the property of being the qualificand and Shakespeare has the property of being the qualifier. Hence the converse of the property of being the qualificand in (ii) will not be the same as the converse of the property of being the qualificand in (i). Similarly, the converse of the property of being the qualifier in (ii) will not be the same as the converse of the property of being the qualifier in (i). From this it follows that the truth of (i) does not entail the truth of (ii). Similarly, the truth of Hence his mental-state is not related to the fact, namely, Shakespeare being qualified by the property of being Shakespeare. On the contrary, if "Shakespeare" is not a proper name but a definite description in disguise, then the form of (iii) does not differ from that of (iv).
In (iv) the belief-state of John is not related to any winged horse. It is related to a horse (or a unique horse), wings, and the relation of a wing to an animal which has wings. But it is not related to the qualified object, viz., the winged horse. Hence the converse of the first three relations only would characterise the belief-state of John. As his belief-state is not related to the qualified object, the converse of this relation cannot qualify his belief. (iv)
gives us the model for the treatment of empty singular terms which have occurred in believed-sentences or expressions.
In (v) the belief-state of John is related to Shakespeare qualified by the property of being Shakespeare, an object qualified by the property existence, 58 and the relation of identity. If the believed sentence is true, then his belief-state is also related to Shakespeare as being identical with an existent object, and the converses of these four relations would characterise the mental state of John. This analysis also shows how the Nyāya draws the distinction between (iii) and (v), and thereby explains the difference in meaning between "Shakespeare" and "Shakespeare exists". In this context, it is to be noted that the Nyāya, unlike some contemporary philosophers, has E E not identified the meaning of `Shakespeare exists' with that of `Shakespeare is Shakespeare'. Similarly, the Nyāya has drawn a distinction in meaning between "The author of Waverley", "The author of Waverley exists" and "The author of Waverley is the author of Waverley".
Since (vi) can be true without implying the existence of Ortcutt or without implying Ortcutt being a spy, the Nyāya claims that the belief-state of John is related to Ortcutt, but need not be related to Ortcutt qualified by the property existence. This is due to the fact that existence is a property in the Nyāya system. Therefore, the relation to the property-posessor does not imply the relation to its properties, such as existence. The belief state is also related to a spy, and a relation of identity, but not to Ortcutt being identical with a spy. Hence the converses of these three relations would qualify the belief-state of John. This analysis also shows why the rule of existential
generalisation cannot be applied to it.
(vii) could be true even if no one is a spy, and hence the belief-state cannot be related to a spy. According to the Nyāya in this case, the beliefstate is related to the property spyhood, an existent object, and the relation of instantiation, but not to an existent object qualified by spyhood. Hence the belief-state is qualified by the converse of these three relational properties only. If spyhood is an unexemplified property, then the word "spyhood" cannot be treated as an atomic expression. Hence it is to be explained in terms of at least two non-empty terms, and the belief-state is related to the referents of these non-empty terms.
In (viii) the belief-state is not only related to Ortcutt, a spy and the relation of identity, but also related to Ortcutt qualified by existence. But it is not related to Ortcutt qualified by existence being identical with a spy.
Hence the mental state is qualified by the converses of the first four relations only. Hence the truth of (viii) will depend on the truth of "( x)(x = Ortcutt)"
but not on the truth of "Ortcutt is a spy."
In (ix) the belief-state is related to Ortcutt, the absence of spyhood which is present somewhere, and the relation of an absence to its possessor, 59 but it is not related to Ortcutt qualified by the absence of spyhood. Hence the truth of (ix) does not depend on the truth of "Ortcutt is not a spy."
As regards (x), the Nyāya claims that it cannot be made true under any condition. Since there is no contradiction anywhere, there cannot be any contradiction at the level of thought or belief-state. 60 The sentence "Ortcutt is a spy and Ortcutt is not a spy" is meaningful, but it does not generate a cognition either in a hearer or a speaker. Each of the conjuncts of this E conjunctive sentence would generate a separate cognition, but there is no one unified cognition which will correspond to this sentence. The thought of "Ortcutt is a spy" would prevent occurrence of the thought of "Ortcutt is not a spy" and vice versa. Hence these two thoughts or belief-states are related to each other by the preventer-prevented relation.
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(xi) describes the mental or the belief-state of Tom, and it could be true even if John does not believe that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley or no one believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley. In this case
Tom's belief-state is related to a belief-state, not necessarily to a beliefstate of John. Furthermore, his belief-state is related to the converse of the relation of a belief to Shakespeare, the converse of the relation of a belief to the author of Waverley, and the converse of the relation of a belief to the relation of identity. Moreover, Tom's belief-state is related to John and to the relation of inherence which relates a belief-state to its possessor in the ontology of the Nyāya. Let us use the following symbols for these relations:
A for the relation of Tom's belief-state to some other beliefstate.
B for the relation of his belief-state to the converse of the relation of a belief to Shakespeare.
C for the relation of his belief-state to the converse of the relation of a belief to the author of Waverley.
D for the relation of his belief-state to the converse of the relation of a belief to an identity relation.
E for the relation of Tom's belief-state to John. Since the Nyāya philosophers can explain belief-sentences which contain negation, conjunction, quantifier, or which express higher-order beliefs, they can explain all types of belief-sentences in a standard language. Now let us consider Kripke's puzzle about belief. 62 He claims that codesignative proper names are not interchangeable in belief contexts salva veritate. Hence one may assent to "Cicero was bald" and to "Tully was not bald", although both "Cicero" and "Tully" refer to the same person. Kripke has put forward the following example to substantiate this point. Pierre, a native of France, asserts in French (a) Londres est jolie. After moving to
London from France, he assents to (b) London is not pretty.
From this example Kripke concludes that co-referential terms cannot be substituted for each other without changing the truth-value.
From the Nyāya point of view we can say that co-designative terms are interchangeable in belief contexts if they have the same limitor. Suppose
Cicero has a unique and an essential property, say F. According to the Nyāya, the meaning of the name "Cicero" includes both the person referred to by the word "Cicero" and the limitor F. If "Tully" also refers to the same person under the same mode of presentation, then both of them have the same meaning. Since we are concerned with belief, we can use any language to describe it. Hence it has nothing to do with assenting to a sentence, which requires mastery over a language, including knowing the meanings of the terms. Even if a person does not know any language, we can describe his belief-state in our language. If we come to know that Pierre believes that
Londres est jolie, then we can use English or any other language to describe the same belief-state. Hence we can claim that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Therefore, any synonymous expression or sentence can be used to describe the same belief. This is how the Nyāya philosophers would solve the puzzle about belief.
From the above discussion it follows that Nyāya techniques may be properties, such as the property of being the qualificand, the property of being the qualifier, the property of being the qualification relation, the property of being the limitor, the property of being the determiner, the property of being the qualified object, the property of being the subject and the property of being the predicate. By using these relational properties and their converses, we can draw not only the distinction between different belief-sentences but also the distinction in meaning between sentences, such as "Brutus killed Caesar" and "Caesar was killed by Brutus". Hence the sentences which are transformationally equivalent. 
